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Defending Iowa's
First-in-the-Nation Status
The 1984 Precinct Caucuses
HUGH WINEBRENNER
FROM A POSITION of relative obscurity before 1972, the Iowa pre-
cinct caucuses evolved to their present position of national
prominence in the presidential nominating process.' In recent
elections, the time and attention given the Iowa caucuses by
presidential candidates and the national media have increased
geometrically. The impact of the caucuses has grown to the point
that Iowa now rivals New Hampshire for the title of presidential
kingmaker.^
The transformation of the caucuses into a national event is
an asset for the state. Iowa benefits from the national publicity
surrounding the caucuses and the numerous in-depth stories
about the state and its people. The caucuses also generate large
sums of money for the state's economy as presidential candi-
dates spend in pursuit of delegates, and the media also expend
large sums to cover the campaigns. The national attention helps
the Iowa Democratic and Republican parties by stimulating in-
terest and participation in the caucus process. State officials of
both parties are pleased to identify sources of citizen support
several months before the November elections. They also are
pleased by the increased status accorded the parties and their
1. For a discussion of the changes in the Iowa precinct caucuses, see
Hugh Winebrenner, "The Evolution of the Iowa Precinct Caucuses," The An-
nals of Iowa 46 (Spring 1983): 618-35.
2. See Michael J. Robinson, Nancy Conover, and Margaret Sheehan,
"The Media at Mid-Year," in Presidential Politics: Readings on Nominations and
Elections, ed. James I. Lengle and Byron E. Shafer, 2nd ed. (New York, 1983),
147-48. Also see Hugh Winebrenner, "The Iowa Precinct Caucuses: The Mak-
ing of a Media Event," Southeastern Political Review (Fall 1985).
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leaders, many of whom have been quoted in national publica-
tions such as Time and Newsweek.
But not everyone is pleased with the early precinct caucuses
and their impact on the presidential selection process. Several
states, undoubtedly envious of the status afforded Iowa, and
probably not wanting a small farm state which normally supports
Republican presidential candidates to play a pivotal role in choos-
ing the Democratic nominee, have pressed for changes in the
party rules governing the Democratic nominating process.^
Although party rules which compressed the Democratic
nominating process into a thirteen-week period between the
second Tuesday in March and the second Tuesday in June
were enacted for 1980, Iowa's (and New Hampshire's) posi-
tion of prominence was preserved by the inclusion of an ap-
peals process for states that held nominating events earlier in
1976. Iowa Democrats requested and received a variance to
hold their 1980 precinct caucuses in January, thus success-
fully parrying attempts to limit their influence in the presi-
dential selection process.
Efforts to limit the impact of Iowa and New Hampshire in
the nominating process were renewed after the 1980 caucuses
and primary elections.* The Democratic National Committee
(DNC) appointed the Commission on Presidential Nominations
(Hunt Commission) to consider a number of changes in the
nominating process. Their January 15, 1982, report included a
recommendation (proposed rule 10) that the length of the Dem-
ocratic primary schedule be compressed into a thirteen-week
period between the second Tuesday in March and the second
Tuesday in June. In deference to Iowa and New Hampshire, they
granted permanent exemptions from the schedule for the Iowa
and New Hampshire nominating events although both had to
be held later in 1984. (Iowa may hold its Democratic caucuses no
earlier than fifteen days before the start of the thirteen-week pe-
riod and New Hampshire seven days.) The exception gives Iowa
and New Hampshire the opportunity to focus national attention
on their primary events as in the past, but may lessen the long-
term impact, as candidates can tumble more quickly from victor-
3. Iowa had voted for the Republican candidate in eight of the last nine
presidential races.
4. See Winebrenner, "Making of a Media Event."
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ies (or rebound more quickly from defeats) in Iowa and New
Hampshire. (The recommendations were accepted by the na-
tional committee on March 26,1982, and made part of the Rules
of the National Party.)
Following the DNC decision, a dispute developed between
New Hampshire and Vermont over the date of Vermont's "Town
Meeting Day" which includes a presidential straw poll and tradi-
tionally is held on the first Tuesday in March. In 1984, that fell on
March 6 which was the scheduled date for the New Hampshire
presidential primary election. The DNC-approved thirteen-week
"window" did not apply to non-binding electoral events such as
Vermont's. The potential for conflict between the two states ap-
parently had been underestimated by the Hunt Commission;
although well aware of the date of the Vermont straw poll, the
commission did not believe it necessary to schedule the New
Hampshire primary election earlier than March 6.^  New Hamp-
shire and the DNC were unsuccessful in resolving the conflict
and New Hampshire Democrats, not wishing to share the lime-
light with Vermont on March 6, defied national party rules and
moved its primary election forward a week to February 28.
Predictably, Iowa Democrats were extremely upset by the
decision which would have narrowed the separation between
the New Hampshire primary election and the Iowa caucuses to a
single day.* Fearful that Iowa's impact in the Democratic party
nominating process would be greatly diminished, Iowa Demo-
crats discussed changing the date of their 1984 caucuses at a No-
vember 19, 1983, meeting of the state central committee.^ John
Law, former executive director of the Iowa Democratic party and
a member of the Hunt Commission, informed the committee
that a commission compromise had led to the new party rules
governing the length of the primary and caucus schedule, and it
was his understanding that Iowa had been guaranteed an eight-
day separation between the New Hampshire and Iowa primary
5. See Edward Campbell et al. v. Iowa State Democratic Central Commit-
tee and David Nagle, No. 83-115-W, 6 (S.D. Ia. January 17,1984).
6. The Iowa General Assembly reacted to the threat by passing legisla-
tion that requires the Iowa precinct caucuses to be held at least eight days ear-
lier than any other nominating event. See Iowa, Acts and Resolutions of the
Seventieth General Assembly, 1983, chap. 138, 306.
7. The following discussion is based on my notes of the meeting of the
Democratic State Central Committee.
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events. He further argued that if New Hampshire violated party
rules by moving its primary election forward and the DNC did
not force them back into compliance, Iowa should advance its
caucus date to maintain the eight-day separation. Members of
the DNC Compliance Committee in attendance argued against
a change in caucus dates and threatened disciplinary action
against the Iowa Democratic party if national party rules were
violated. The debate was spirited and sometimes animated be-
fore Bill Sueppel of Iowa City proposed a compromise that ulti-
mately carried by a vote of twenty to ten: the Iowa caucuses
would be held on February 20,1984, unless New Hampshire de-
cided on or before December 10,1983, to return its primary elec-
tion to the original March 6 date. If New Hampshire relented,
the Iowa caucuses would be held on February 27 as originally
scheduled. The deadline passed without action by New Hamp-
shire and Iowa Democrats proceeded with plans for a February
20 caucus date in 1984.
The controversy over the decision to change the caucus date
did not end on December 10, however. In Iowa, three prominent
Democrats—Edward Campbell, former state party chair and co-
chair of the Móndale for President effort in Iowa; Jean Haugland,
also a Móndale co-chair; and Charles Gifford, a member of the
State Central Committee—filed suit in federal district court to
block the change from February 27 to February 20.^
The plaintiffs requested "that the Court enjoin the State
Party from holding statewide caucuses on a date prior to the
27th day of February, 1984, as an earlier date would jeopardize
the seating of Iowa delegates at the Democratic National Con-
vention."^ In testimony, Gifford further asserted "that the State
Party is obligated to follow the clear dictates of the National
Party Rules and that failure to do so may well jeopardize Iowa's
first-in-the-nation status in future election years."^° In defend-
ing the decision to move the caucus date forward, the state party,
with presidential candidates Alan Cranston and John Glenn as
intervenors, argued that the campaigns of some presidential
candidates would suffer irreparable harm due to their large ex-
8. Edward Campbell et al. v. Iowa State Democratic Central
Committee.
9. Ibid., 2.
10. Ibid., 10.
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penditures of time and money in Iowa if the date were not
changed to February 20."
The court ruled in favor of the defendants and let the earlier
date stand. In the decision, the court agreed that the plaintiffs
were entitled to relief, but found for the defendants because "the
intervenor presidential candidates will suffer a significant harm
if the caucuses are not held on February 20, as their previous
commitments may be wasted or reduced in effectiveness." The
court added that "the individual damages that may be suffered
by the plaintiffs are outweighed by the irreparable harm that
changing the rules of the presidential nominating process [in
Iowa] at this late date may have."'^
The DNC entered the controversy by threatening sanctions
if Iowa moved its caucus date forward, including the possibility
of not seating the Iowa delegation selected by the "illegal" caucus
process at the Democratic national convention. Ultimately, the
DNC relented and on May 3,1984, agreed to seat both the Iowa
and New Hampshire delegations at San Francisco, but scars re-
main from the intraparty struggle.
BY 1984, the Iowa precinct caucuses were institutionalized as a
significant part of the primary and caucus schedule. The 1980
efforts of Carter, Kennedy, and Bush demonstrated that a strong
organization was necessary to compete in Iowa and that the
"dark horse" candidacies of McGovern in 1972 and Carter in
1976 probably would not recur now that Iowa was a well-
publicized event in the presidential nominating process. To fare
well in Iowa would require a major organizational effort, but
with New Hampshire a week later and "Super Tuesday" with its
ten state delegate selection events on March 13, candidate ef-
forts could not be concentrated in the state as they were when
several weeks separated Iowa and New Hampshire.
Democratic presidential candidates were commonplace in
Iowa from 1982 to 1984 as each worked to enlist supporters and
develop an organization capable of identifying and turning out
potential caucus supporters. Although most of the Democratic
hopefuls made a strong effort and spent large sums of money
11. Ibid., 13.
12. Ibid.
296
Defending Iowa's Status
and energy pursuing support, it was no contest from the start.
Móndale was well known in Iowa and he received early support
from the United Auto Workers and the Iowa State Education As-
sociation. The support of organized groups and endorsements
from many prominent Iowa Democrats helped Móndale de-
velop an organization that was "clearly superior to others."" He
developed an early lead in the polls, never relinquished the
front-runner status, and entered the final stages of the Iowa
campaign with a commanding lead. Other Democrats also made
significant organizational efforts in the state, but with Móndale
enjoying a seemingly insurmountable lead, they competed for
second place and hoped for a stronger-than-predicted finish.
Alan Cranston was probably the next best organized of the
Democratic candidates and the fifty-five days and $727,358 that
he spent in Iowa in the two years prior to the 1984 caucuses
topped all presidential hopefuls. He made nuclear disarmament
the central issue in his campaign and was well known in Iowa by
the time of the caucuses.^^
Gary Hart was the first candidate to open an Iowa cam-
paign office but it took him a long time to develop an effective
organization. Limited funds, the decision to move a number of
his campaign staff to Wisconsin where he unsuccessfully com-
peted in that state's straw poll, and the resignation of top aides
made continuity difficult; but he appeared well organized in the
final weeks of the Iowa campaign.
John Glenn apparently never understood the nature of a
caucus organization as he ran a primary election race in Iowa.
The $759,178 spent by his campaign included heavy expendi-
tures on television which may work well in a primary election
but generally produce few results in the Iowa caucuses. (John
Connally unsuccessfully employed the same approach in the
1980 caucuses.)
13. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 12 January 1983, 2601.
14. The campaign data were obtained from the candidates. From 1982 to
1984, Askew campaigned in Iowa 47 days, Cranston 55, Glenn 33, Hart 60,
HoUings 14, Jackson 2, McGovern 37, and Móndale 34 days. Spending data from
the Federal Election Commission indicate caucus expenditures in Iowa as follows:
Askew $194,315, Cranston $727,358, Glenn $759,178, Hart $453,503, HoUings
$11,382, Jackson $8,953, McGovern $52,403, and Móndale $687,712.
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Reuben Askew's forty-seven campaign days in Iowa were
exceeded only by Cranston, and his attempts to organize the
right wing of the party, and particularly the anti-abortion vote,
were not appreciated by Iowa Democrats who had seen that
group help defeat Democratic candidates in three recent Iowa
general elections.^^ The other Democratic candidates—Ceorge
McGovern, Ernest HoUings, and Jesse Jackson—had little or no
organization in Iowa.'^
The media also came to Iowa very early to follow the Demo-
cratic candidates. A 1982 Newsweek story detailed the early ef-
forts of the Democratic hopefuls and speculated on their
chances in Iowa.'^ Media coverage waxed and waned from 1982
to 1984 but on special occasions such as the "Open Forum on
Arms Control with Presidential Candidates" held in Des Moines
on August 13,1983, and the Des Moines Register debate on Feb-
ruary 11, 1984, attended by all eight Democratic presidential
candidates, national media attention focused on Iowa.
In the final weeks leading to the caucuses reporters
searched for the ''typical Iowan" to interview, and most of all,
played the "expectations game."i^ Móndale was judged the
"clear front-runner" and John Glenn the "primary challenger"
even though a significant Glenn campaign organization never
developed in Iowa. McGovern, Hart, and Cranston were
branded "dark horses"; HoUings, Askew, and the late entrant,
Jesse Jackson, were dismissed as "also rans."^'
As the caucuses neared, media coverage was awesome. The
press "filing space" for the 1984 caucus night was double that of
1980. Over one thousand press credentials were issued by the
Iowa Democratic party to representatives of approximately 150
United States and foreign news organizations: over thirty televi-
sion and many radio stations were represented in Iowa; Meet the
Press and Face the Nation originated from Des Moines on the day
before the caucuses; on February 20, the day of the caucuses, the
15. David Yepsen, Des Moines Register, 6 February 1984,15A.
16. J.P. Steffen, caucus chairperson, Iowa Democratic party, interview
with author, 4 December 1984.
17. Nerostüeeit, 24 May 1982, 31-32.
18. For a discussion of the game aspects of campaigns, see Thomas E.
Patterson, The Mass Media Election: How Americans Choose Their President
(NewYork, 1980), 22-24.
19. Congressional Quarterly, 2599-2600.
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Today Show and the evening news programs of ABC, CBS, NBC,
and CNN broadcast live from Des Moines.^ ^ The 1984 Demo-
cratic caucuses were a bigger media event than ever before.
Turnout for the 1984 precinct caucuses was high but less
than in 1980. Democratic party officials estimated that seventy-
five thousand people attended their meetings (approximately 14
percent of the registered Democrats). A definitive explanation is
not possible, but Mondale's early big lead and media overkill
probably contributed to the 25 percent decline in attendance
from 1980.21
After months under the media microscope and to the relief
of many Iowans, the 8 p.m. starting time for the February 20
precinct caucuses finally arrived. It took twelve minutes for
controversy to erupt. On the basis of a review of "sign-in
sheets" at some caucuses, CBS projected Walter Móndale the
Iowa winner at 8:12 p.m. (CST), eighteen minutes before Dem-
ocratic party rules permitted the delegate selection process to
begin.^^ NBC used polls and News Election Service (a vote
counting service funded by ABC, CBS, NBC, AP, and UPI) data
to project at 8:18 p.m. that Móndale "will be the winner," John
Glenn "will not finish second," and "there is a very good chance
tonight that Cary Hart will be second."" ABC withheld its pro-
jection that Móndale would win and that Glenn, Hart, and
Cranston were "fighting it out for second place" until 8:46 p.m.,
sixteen minutes after the caucuses began but before any dele-
gate counts were available.^ "^ (Delegates elected to county con-
ventions provide the official basis for determining winners and
losers in the Iowa caucuses.)
Iowa Democrats were very disturbed by the early media
projections and so was the United States Congress. On February
27, 1984, the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection, and Finance held a hearing on early elec-
20. Barry Piatt, press secretary, Iowa Democratic party, telephone inter-
view with author, 19 March 1984.
21. Steffen interview.
22. Early Election Projection: The Iowa Experience, Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance;
Committee on Energy and Commerce; House of Representatives; 27 February
1984,12.
23. Ibid., 14.
24. Ibid.
299
THE ANNALS OF IOWA
tion projections which centered on the Iowa caucuses. Chair-
man Tim Wirth (D., Colorado) informed those present that the
hearing was being held "to discuss the civic responsibility of the
electronic media and the implications that their methods and
their announcements of projected results have on the electoral
process."^^ A number of research papers were received and testi-
mony was taken from top media executives and leaders of the
Republican and Democratic parties. Dave Nagle, Iowa Demo-
cratic chair, testified that the state party had evidence that the
early projections found their way into caucuses that were in
progress. Nagle warned that "to report the supposed outcome of
our process before it even begins .. . runs the risk of seriously in-
truding on the process and damaging the party."^^
The subcommittee continued hearings on the problems of
early 1984 election projections, and late in the year, two con-
gressmen, Al Swift (D., Washington) and Bill Thomas (R., Cali-
fornia), formally asked ABC, CBS, and NBC for "a firm, explicit,
public, corporate commitment not to use exit poll data to sug-
gest, through interpretation of that data, the probable winner in
any state until the polls in that state have closed."^^ By early
1985, the three networks had forwarded letters to Congressmen
Swift and Thomas which stated that in future elections they
would not "use exit polling data to project or characterize elec-
tion results until the polls are closed in [that] state.'^^ In return,
the congressmen agreed to begin hearings on a uniform election
day throughout the United States. It is not clear how the agree-
ment will affect reporting of Iow^ a caucus outcomes. If taken lit-
erally, the 1984 projections of caucus results based on entrance
polls and party "sign-in sheets" will not recur in 1988.
The early projections were not the only controversy associ-
ated with results. Apparently sensitive to the criticism that Iowa
caucus results are not meaningful, the electronic and print
media requested the Iowa Democratic party to provide a break-
down of the candidate preferences of those attending the 1984
25. Ibid., 5.
26. Ibid., 78.
27. Congressmen Al Swift and William M. Thomas, Letter to ABC, CBS,
and NBC, U.S. House of Representatives, 6 December 1984.
28. Press conference. Congressmen Al Swift and William M. Thomas,
Rayburn Office Building, Washington D.C., 17 January 1985.
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caucuses. In essence, they were asking the party to conduct a
straw poll of caucus members and provide raw vote totals rather
than the delegate equivalent totals reported since 1972. Iowa
Democrats asserted that raw vote totals would misrepresent the
caucus process and refused to bow to media demands.^* The
media responded by employing the News Election Service to at-
tempt to determine candidate preference totals at the caucuses.
Since the caucus process does not lend itself to tabulating candi-
date preferences, and the Iowa Democratic party refused to co-
operate, the news election service was able to provide prefer-
ence totals for only 74 percent of the 2,495 precincts; those totals
are of questionable validity due to the dynamic nature of the
caucus process. The presence of two sets of results proved to be
confusing to all.
As caucus results began to come in on February 20, the "ex-
pectations game" continued with media interpretation of the
outcomes. Some of the media reported News Election Service
results; some Democratic party delegate equivalents, and others
reported both.^ o The Newsweek summary of the Iowa caucuses
was representative. They concluded that "Mondale's victory met
all expectations," and Glenn's "humiliating fifth-place finish"
was a disaster for his campaign. McGovern's third-place finish
was "startling" and "the caucuses gave Hart 'media momen-
tum.'" Cranston, Askew, and Hollings were declared the big los-
ers along with Glenn. On the basis of Iowa, Newsweek reduced
the field to Móndale, Hart, Jackson, "and maybe Glenn." Per-
haps the biggest winner in the Iowa expectations game was Hart
since he was elevated to the position of Mondale's primary com-
petitor, a position previously assigned to Glenn.^ ^ On the Febru-
ary 23 NBC Nightly News, Don Oliver reported that after Iowa,
29. "Caucus Results Are Tabulated for Good of Party, Not Press," Des
Moines Register, 16 October 1983.
30. The official Democratic party results are weighted county delegates
from 94 percent of the precincts: Móndale 48.9 percent. Hart 16.5 percent,
McGovern 10.3 percent. Uncommitted 9.4 percent, Cranston 7.4 percent,
Glenn 3.5 percent. Askew 2.5 percent, Jackson 1.5 percent, and Hollings 0 per-
cent. The NES results are from 74 percent of the precincts: Móndale 44.5 per-
cent. Hart 14.8 percent, McGovern 12.6 percent, Cranston 9.0 percent.
Uncommitted 7.5 percent, Glenn 5.3 percent. Askew 3.3 percent, Jackson 2.7
percent, and Hollings 0.3 percent.
31. Newsweefc, 5 March 1984, 22-23.
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contributions to the Hart campaign increased from $2,000 to
$12,000 per day.
THE REPUBLICANS also held precinct caucuses in 1984, but with
an incumbent president seeking reelection there was no media
interest in their meetings until President Reagan decided to visit
Iowa on February 20, the day of the caucuses. The president ap-
peared in Waterloo and Des Moines in an attempt to increase in-
terest in the Republican caucuses and perhaps to steal some of
the limelight from the Democrats who had monopolized media
attention in Iowa for several weeks.
The straw poll initiated in 1976 and continued in 1980 was not
conducted in the 1984 Republican caucuses. The rationale offered
by Republican officials for the absence of a poll was the lack of a
contest for the nomination. This was probably a wise move on the
part of Republican leaders as it assured no media publicity for any
dissatisfied Republicans that might have attended caucuses.
Attendance figures for the Republican caucuses are very tentative
due to the absence of a poll, but it was estimated that twenty-three
to thirty thousand people participated.^^
Although they have cooperated with their Democratic coun-
terparts, Iowa's Republican party has played a more limited role in
defending the state's position of prominence. The national Repub-
lican party has no rules governing the length of their primary and
caucus season, and when Iowa raised the issue at the 1984 national
convention, there was little interest in developing such rules. To
date, there have been no significant threats from other state Re-
publican parties, but Iowa Republicans believe that could change
by 1988. There are rumblings from other states, notably Michigan,
about moving their 1986 off-year caucuses forward in order to be
in a position to challenge Iowa for the early date in 1988.^ ^
Shortly after the 1984 Democratic National Convention,
the now predictable assault on the date of the Iowa caucuses
began anew. Representative Morris Udall (D., Arizona) and Sen-
ator Dennis DeConcini (D., Arizona) introduced companion
bills (H.R. 6054 and S. 2890) to Congress on July 31, 1984. The
32. Luke Roth, executive director. Republican party of Iowa, telephone
interview with author, 7 December 1984.
33. Tamara Paulin, organization director. Republican party of Iowa, tele-
phone interview with author, 7 May 1985.
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bills would have required "that Presidential primaries or cau-
cuses be held only during the period beginning on the second
Tuesday in March and ending on the second Tuesday in June of
the year of the Presidential election." A Task Force on Elections
created by the Committee on House Administration held a hear-
ing on September 19, 1984, but the bills died in the Ninety-
eighth Congress.
Congressman Udall reintroduced an identical bill (H.R.
1380) on February 28,1985. In describing the bill for the House,
Udall explained that "it would make two small, but important
changes in the way we choose our Presidential nominees. First,
the primary season would be limited to a specific period of time,
eliminating the disproportionate influence of a few early pri-
mary states. Second, a shorter primary season would reduce the
amount of campaign spending and relieve some of the 'boredom
factor' experienced by many voters.''^''
If judged from a historical perspective, the likelihood of
Congressman Udall successfully reforming the Iowa and New
Hampshire nominating events out of existence is not good; since
1911, none of the approximately three hundred bills designed to
reform or alter the presidential nominating process has passed
the Congress.^^
It appears likely that Iowa will continually have to defend
its "first-in-the-nation" status in the presidential campaign.
Without an incumbent presidential candidate in 1988, both the
Republican and Democratic party races are likely to be spirited
events. The stakes are so high that other state parties, in all likeli-
hood, will take aim at the early date of the Iowa caucuses.
34. Congressional Record, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, E723.
35. John Hyde, Des Moines Register, 20 September 1984, 3A.
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